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TORT IN A CONTRACTUAL MATRIX©
By JOHN G. FLEMING*

This article addresses one aspect of the interface
between tort and contract: the way tort law is affected,
whether by extending or contracting its reach, by the
parties coming together against a contractual structure.
Two basic situations are considered. The first concerns
the effect of a contractual limitation clause on the tort
liability of, or to, a third party such as a subcontractor's
to the building owner. The second considers what
effect to attribute to a plaintiff's failure to protect
himself or herself in advance by contracting against the
risk

Cet article aborde un aspect de l'interaction entre la loi
des ddlits et celle du contrat: la fagon dont la loi des
d6lits est influenc6e, soit en 6largissant ou en
contraignant sa portee, par la rencontre des parties
dans le contexte d'une structure contractuelle. Deux
situations fondamentales sont consid6rdes. En premier
lieu, il s'agit de l'effet d'une clause contractuelle
limitative sur Ia responsabilit6 de, ou A,un tiers, tel que
la responsabilit6 d'un sous-contractant au propri~taire
de l'Edifice. Deuxi~mement, nous considdrons quel
effet attribuer Al'6chec du plaignant de se protdger en
avance en contractant contre le risque.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Contract and tort intersect in different contexts, occasioning
problems that do not yield to any simple and uniform solution. Often,
the question is whether any perceived gap in contractual doctrine, such
as the insistence on privity or consideration, should be filled by a tort
remedy.1 I propose to address a very different question: the way in
© 1996, J.G. Fleming.
* Professor of Law, Emeritus, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California at Berkeley.

This paper is based on a lecture delivered at Osgoode Hall Law School of York University on 11
February 1995.
1 Thus the "disappointed legatee" is not germane to my present remit; nor are the "black
hole" problems such as Leigh & Sillavan Ltd v. Aliakmon Shipping Co., [1986] A.C. 785 (H.L.)
[hereinafter TheAliakmon], rev'g [1985] Q.B. 350 (C.A.); TheAlbazero, [1977] A.C. 774 (H.L.); and
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which tort law has been affected, whether by extending or contracting its
reach, by a "contractual matrix,"2 by "the parties com[ing] together
against a contractual structure." 3 My role thus defined guards me
against the possible charge of harbouring, as a tort lawyer, a preference
for tort solutions at the intersection between contract and tort. Indeed,
far from this being the case, my preference for the contract solution-for
example, in overcoming the "privity gap"-is not only based on the
argument that it would spare us collateral problems (such as the
applicability of limitation clauses), but also on the conviction that the
be
difficulty stems from a flaw in our contract law which can, and should,
4
more expeditiously remedied on its own terms than by resort to tort.
Let me begin with a preliminary observation. It is no
exaggeration to say that the tort law of the last twenty-five years has
been virtually obsessed with the question of negligent economic loss.
That exclusive focus has tended to obscure the fact that the defining
element in many of these cases was the contractual matrix in which the
loss occurred. In recent years, however, the contractual context has
moved into the foreground of discussion. The fact that the situations
most frequently involving economic loss have their counterpart also in
cases of property damage only confirms my thesis. Thus, in one of the
construction cases, concerning a claim by the owner against a
subcontractor, the loss incurred was not the cost of repairing the defect,
but damage to adjacent propertyS Another somewhat similar recent
case also involved damage to tangible property, when a bailee's servants
caused structural damage to a warehoused transformer. 6 In both cases,7
the question was whether the primafacie duty of Donoghue v. Stevenson
Linden Gardens Trust v. Lenesta Sludge Disposals, [1994] A.C. 85 (H.L.) [hereinafter Linden
Gardens], app'd in DarlingtonBorough Council v. Wdtshier Northern Ltd., [1995] 1 W.L.R. 68 (C.A.).
From that viewpoint, see F. Reynolds, "Contract and Tort: The View from the Contract Side of the
Fence" (1994) 5 Cant. L. Rev. 280.
2 1 take this term from the judgment of La Forest J. in London Drugs Ltd. v. Kuehne & Nagel
Int'lLtd., [1992] 3 S.C.R. 299 at 327 [hereinafter London Drugs].
3 See PacificAssociates v. Baxter, [1990] 1 Q.B. 993 at 1010 (C.A.), Purchas LJ. [hereinafter
PacificAssociates] at 1010. See also J. Blom, "Interface between Tort and Contract," in P.T. Burns
& S.J. Lyons, eds., Donoghue v. Stevenson and the Modern Law of Negligence: The Paisley Papers
(Vancouver: Continuing Legal Education Society of B.C., 1991) 139.
4 1 am thinking here of claims like those of a subsequent purchaser of a housing unit against a
negligent builder for the cost of repairing the defect. Compare Winnipeg Condominium Corp. v.
Bird Construction, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 85; andBryan v. Moloney (1995), 69 A.LJ.R. 375 (Tasmania S.C.).
5 Norwich City Council v. Harvey, [1989] 1 W.L.R. 828 (C.A.) [hereinafter Norwich City
Council].
6 London Drugs, supra note 2.
7 [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L) [hereinafter Donoghue].
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was negatived by the contractual matrix in which the relation between
plaintiff and defendant originated.
As an introduction to these "contort" 8 problems, the basic
"concurrence" question should first be briefly addressed. English law, in
contrast to the French, 9 eventually took the view that a contractual
obligation between the parties does not preclude the concurrence of a
tort duty in the same respect, so that the injured party has the option to
pursue either a contractual or a tortious remedy. Initially encountered
mainly in relation to claims for personal injury and property damage,
application of this principle has been greatly increased by the
contemporaneous expansion of negligence liability for economic loss,
especially in its application to professional services by accountants,
bankers, and lawyers ° The motivation behind this development seems
to have been to make procedural and other advantages of tort, such as
contribution or a more favourable starting point for the period of
limitation, available to the claimant. Moreover, it makes no sense to
withhold these advantages from recipients of contractual, as opposed to
gratuitous, services. But the tort duty is subject to contractual
modifications, such as a lower standard of care or limitation of liability,
in deference to the belief in the primacy of private ordering.1 1 In short,
is, to borrow Peter
the starting point for tort in a contractual matrix
' 12
Cane's pithy axiom, that "contract trumps tort.
II. LIMITATION CLAUSES
Much more complex is the "triangular" situation: the effect, if
any, of a contract upon the possible tort remedy of or against an
13
outsider. Following closely on the steps of Donoghue, the Grant case
taught that the days when a contract duty to A precluded a tort duty to B
8 The term was coined by G. Gilmore, The Death of Contract (Columbus: Ohio State
University Press, 1974) at 90.
9 See T. Weir, "Complex Liabilities" in Int'lEnc. Comp. L., vol. 11, Torts (The Hague; Boston:
M. Nijhoff, 1983) at 12:52.
10
Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates, [1995] 2 A.C. 145 (H.L.) [hereinafter Henderson];Mouat v.
Clark Boyce, [1992] 2 N.Z.L.R. 559 (C.A. Wellington); and CentralTrust Co. v. Rafuse, [1986] 2
S.C.R. 147 [hereinafter CentralTrust].
11 See Central Trust, supra note 10; and British Columbia Hydro and PowerAuthority v. B G
Checo Int'l, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 12.
12
Tort Law and Economic Interests (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991) [hereinafter Tort Law].
13 Grant v. Australian KnittingMills Ltd., [1936] A.C.85 (P.C.) [hereinafter Grant].
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in the same matter were gone. The manufacturer's contractual promise
to the buyer regarding the quality of the product no longer pre-empts an
obligation in tort to the ultimate consumer. Conversely, the buyer's
contractual warranty claim against the retail seller does not preclude a
tort claim against a negligent manufacturer. It is the universality of this
principle, which was being questioned in the two above-mentioned cases,
to which we must now turn.
In the construction cases, the building owrier contracts with a
head contractor for the work to be performed. A subcontractor causes
damage or other loss to the structure, for which the owner is seeking
recovery. Paradigmatically, the subcontractor is under contract with the
head contractor, but not with the owner who suffered the loss. The
reason that the owner does not address his or her complaint to the
contractual partner, namely the head contractor, may be the latter's
impecuniosity (or bankruptcy), a common feature in a lightweight
industry. Most of the recent cases have categorically denied any duty of
care between these parties on the ground that the loss is purely
economic when the claim relates to a deficiency in the work done. 14
That generalization is foreign to my topic except to the extent that it may
rest, in this context, on the residuary argument that the plaintiff could
have planned in advance to shift the risk by contract. Here I am
concerned more specifically with cases where the contract between the
building owner and the head contractor,15 or between the head and
subcontractor, 16 purported to exclude or limit liability. This situation is
by no means limited to claims for purely economic loss, but can also
arise, as one case has already shown, 17 in relation to property
damage-where, in other words, "duty" is prima facie governed by
Donoghue, rather than by any overriding constraints against recovery for
negligent economic loss.
Can the building owner sidestep such a limitation clause by suing
the subcontractor in tort? It would be unrealistic to reject such a claim
outright on the ground that there is no "proximity," the currently
fashionable touchstone of "duty," between the parties. The employment
14 Based on Murphy v. Brentwood District Council, [1991] 1 A.C. 398 (H.L.) [hereinafter
Murphy], categorizing such loss as economic. Such cases include Simaan General Contracting Co. v.
Pilkington Glass Ltd., [1988] Q.B. 758 (C.A.) [hereinafter Simaan]; and Greater Nottingham Cooperative Society Ltd. v. Cementation Pilingand FoundationsLtd., [1989] Q.B. 71 (C.A.) [hereinafter
GreaterNottingham Co-op.]. Compare Henderson,supranote 10.
15
Southern WaterAuthority v. Carey, [1985] 2 All E.R. 1077 (C.A.).
16

Norwich City Council, supranote 5. The clause excluded all liability for fire.
17Ibid
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of subcontractors was clearly contemplated at the time of contracting,
and the risk of their negligence and its effect on the owner's interests
was obvious. But was it "just and reasonable" (to use another favoured
test of duty) to subject the subcontractor to liability in circumstances that
included the contractual background against which he or she had agreed
to perform services? Negating a tort duty can be squared with
conventional analysis as an illustration of the principle of voluntary
assumption of risk: inasmuch as the owner had agreed with the head
contractor to assume the risk of defective performance above the
stipulated sum, the owner assumed the risk of loss from negligence on
the part of the contractor and those whom the latter deputed to perform
the work. If, instead, the limitation clause was in the contract between
the head and subcontractor, it signified all the more the subcontractor's
unwillingness to do the job otherwise than subject to the limitation. At
any rate, if known to the owner, the latter's acquiescence can be deemed
an acceptance of the terms under which alone the subcontractor is
prepared to enter into a relationship defining his or her duty with the
owner. This, in substance, was the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in
denying altogether the existence of any duty
Norwich City Council,when 18
of care owed to the plaintiff.
Where the clause purports, however, to limit rather than exclude
liability, should a tort duty not be recognized subject to the limitation
clause in the contract? This issue has baffled the judges. In one such
instance, TheAliakmon,19 where the consignee of cargo sued the
shipowner who had contracted with the consignor subject to the HagueVisby Rules,20 Donaldson M.R. gave as his principal reason for denying
a tort duty, and Oliver L.J. as an alternative reason, that a tort duty
would be "original," not derivative, and as such could not be subject to
the limitation clause in the bill of lading. Only Goff L.J. in the Court of
Appeal was prepared to invoke the concept of "transferred loss," and

18

Ibid. A limitation or exemption clause in a contract between a bailee and sub-bailee will
bind an owner of the goods who expressly or impliedly consented to the sub-bailment on such terms.
This conclusion is based not on privity of contract but on the rule that a sub-bailee, on receipt,
assumes the obligations of the bailee: The PioneerContainer,[1994] 2 A.C. 324 (P.C.). All the same,
Goff LJ.'s reasoning based on consent could as well have general application.
19 Supra note 1.
20

Protocol to Amend the InternationalConvention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law
Relating to Bills of Lading (Brussels: 23 February 1968), Schedule to the Carriageof Goods by Sea
Act 1971 (U.K.), 1971, c. 19 [hereinafter Hague-Visby Rules].
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thereby recognize a tort claim subject to the contractual limitation.21 It
comes as no surprise that this imaginative solution, following the
2 2 was promptly quashed
German model of Drittschadensliquidation,
by
23
Brandon L.J. in the House of Lords.
Whichever the alternative
-whether a total denial of duty or a duty qualified by the limitation-its
significance is linked to the view that the operation of tort law in the
context of a planned transaction calls for a modification of the rules
familiar in the "classic" non-consensual situations like the typical traffic
accident.

Less problematic, no doubt, would be a contractual solution.
This is preferred by American courts, on the basis of either assignment
or third-party beneficiaries, for claims against subcontractors and
similar claims.2 4 It neatly disposes of the problem of limitation clauses
by respecting the contractual allocation of benefits and burdens. While
at present this solution is blocked for British courts by the rigidity of the
privity doctrine, its adoption is strongly recommended in the academic
literature.2 5
The other illustration of a tort duty modified by a contractual
matrix comes from the important pronouncement of the Supreme Court

21 The same result had earlier been contemplated by Roskill LJ.in the controverted case of
JuniorBooks Ltd v. Veitchi Co., [1983] 1 A.C. 520 at 546 (H.L.) [hereinafter JuniorBooks]. For a
full explanation of The Alialnon, supra note 1, see Reynolds, supra note 1. The precise problem in
The Alialanon-the position of a buyer whose seller retained title at the time of the damage-has
since, with Goff L.J.'s blessing, been removed by giving the buyer a contractual right to sue under
the Carriageof Goods by Sea Act 1992 (U.K.), 1992, c. 50. See R. Bradgate & F. White, "The
Carriageof Goods By Sea Act 1992" (1993) 56 Mod. L. Rev. 188.
.22 See B.S. Markesinis, "An Expanding Tort Law-The Price of A Rigid Contract Law"
(1987) 103 L.Q. Rev. 354 at 387ff.
23 See TheAlialknon, supranote 1 at 820.
24 See W. Jones, "Economic Losses Caused by Construction Deficiencies: The Competing
Regimes of Contract and Tort" (1991) 59 Cin. L. Rev. 1051 at 1077-1101; and M.A. Eisenberg,
"Third-Party Beneficiaries" (1992) 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1358 at 1402-06. The tort solution is
generally, though not uniformly, rejected on the ground that the loss is economic.
The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed an "obligation pour autrui" in Quebec law: Demers v.
Dufresne Engineering Co., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 146. That is more doubtful in French law: see I. Wallace,
Construction Contracts (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1986) at 5.22-5.26. B.S. Markesinis, A
ComparativeIntroduction to the GermanLaw of Torts, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990) adds that,
"it has never been doubted in German law that the contractual debtor can oppose against the third
party/plaintiff all defenses etc. he may have against the contractual creditor."
25 See B.S. Markesinis, "Eternal and Troublesome Triangles" (1990) 106 L.Q. Rev. 566; and
D. Beyleveld & R. Brownsword, "Privity, Transitivity and Rationality" (1991) 54 Mod. L. Rev. 48.
The French theory of "groupes de contrats" has, however, since been dismantled by the Cass. Ass.
pl6n., 12 July 1991, D. 1991.549; 1993 ZEuP 592, in a return to the privity requirement of Art. 1165
C. civ.
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of Canada in London Drugs.26 The plaintiff had delivered a transformer
to a warehouse company for storage under a standard form contract that
stipulated a limitation of liability on any package to $40. The
transformer was severely damaged when two employees, while trying to
move the transformer with forklift trucks, caused it to fall. Could the
plaintiff circumvent the limitation clause by suing the employees in tort?
In contrast to the preceding cases against subcontractors who,
presumably, were at least covered by liability insurance, permitting a
claim against employees would seem at first glance particularly unfair, if
not incongruous, with a modern understanding of labour relations. The
cost of accidents, it is generally believed, is a charge on the employer,
since the employer, unlike the employee, is able to plan against and
absorb it as an overhead of the operations. Nor is it surprising that so
few cases have raised the issue of the tort liability of employees, because
they are rarely worth suing. It would only be in exceptional
circumstances that employees have insurance of their own (for example,
on their own cars), or otherwise command sufficient financial resources
to satisfy a judgment. Thus, the argument that it would be unfair to deny
the injured plaintiff redress against the guilty employee misses the
target, since the plaintiff could not count on the employee's ability to
answer for the damage. The rare case, such as perhaps London Drugs,
where the employer's insurance policy also covered the employees, does
not justify a contrary conclusion.
Likewise, from the employer's point of view, the employer
cannot be expected to bail out the employee in the circumstances. The
employer's contract with the owner of the transformer, limiting his
liability to $40, meant that it was up to the latter to procure extra
insurance. It would thus upset the whole pattern of the warehouse
agreement for the employer to be saddled with the cost of the accident.
Ultimately, limiting the employer's liability to $40 would not
defeat the plaintiffs expectations. Obviously, the warehouse contract
envisaged the participation of employees, and it would be quite
unrealistic to suppose that the plaintiff, while assuming the risk of loss in
excess of $40 vis-a-vis the warehouse operator, reserved recourse against
the latter's employees. Indeed, the benefit of such a manoeuvre, were it
to succeed, would enure not to the plaintiff, but to the insurer, who
would be subrogated to his claim against the hapless employee. Thus,
once again, the intendment of the whole planned arrangement would be
26

Supra note 2 at 299. See also the perceptive economic analysis by N. Siebrasse, "Third-Party
Beneficiaries in the Supreme Court: Categorization and the Interpretation of Ambiguous
Contracts" (1995) 45 U.T.L.J. 47.
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frustrated, not only for the benefit of the tort victim, but for his or her
insurer, who would gain a windfall by being enabled to shift to another
party a loss which he had contracted to underwrite. From every
functional point of view, then, the claim against the employees should
fail, at least in excess of $40, if not altogether.
And so it did. But how? 27 The majority adopted the contract
approach by facing down the privity rule and allowing a limitedjus tertii
to the employees. They should be entitled to invoke a limitation clause
in the contract between their employer and the plaintiff if: (1) that
clause expressly or impliedly extends its benefits to employees seeking to
rely on it; and (2) the employees acted in the course of their employment
and in the performance of the very services provided for in the contract
when the loss occurred. The remaining three justices preferred the tort
approach. McLachlin J. expressed her unease, not so much with
modification of the privity doctrine, as with the finding of the majority
that the employees were implied beneficiaries of the limitation clause,
although they had not been so much as mentioned in the contract. To
give them the benefit of such a clause was to travel far beyond the socalled Himalaya clauses, which had eventually gained recognition by the
Privy Council 28 and could most probably not have been accomplished
even under statutes (such as New Zealand's ContractsPrivity Act 198229)
giving the benefit of contract promises to "intended beneficiaries." She
preferred the "duty" approach from the above-mentioned English cases.
Essentially based on voluntary assumption of risk, it recognized that a
duty of care can be waived or qualified in the light of the contractual
matrix. By agreeing to the limitation clause, the customer had accepted
$40 in the performance of the contract was
that the risk of damage above
30
to be the customer's alone.
27

For more extensive treatment, see J.G. Fleming, "Employee's Tort in a Contractual Matrix:
New Approaches in Canada" (1993) 13 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 430. See also G. Huscroft & J.
Manning, "Employee Liability in Tort: Closing the gap between principle and reality" [1993] N.Z,

Recent L. Rev. 210.
28 See N.Z. Shipping Co. v. A.M. Satterthwaite& Co., [1975] A.C. 154 (P.C.); PortJackson

Stevedoring Pty. Ltd. v. Salmond & Spraggon (Australia) Pty. Ltd., [1981] 1 W.L.R. 138 (P.C.); and
ITO-InternationalTerminalOperatorsLtd. v. MildaElectronicsInc., [1986] 1 S.C.R. 752.

29 1982, N.Z. Stat. No. 132., as am. 1988, No. 110, ss. 10(2), 62, and 63; 1989, No. 107, s. 10(1);
and 1991, No. 61, s. 19(1).
30 A similar solution had been anticipated in Norwich City Council, supra note 5 at 833-34:
In addition, the plaintiff pointed to the position of the first defendant, the subcontractor's

employee. Ex hypothesi he was careless and even if his employer be held to have owed
no duty to the building owner, on what grounds can it be said that the employee himself
owed no such duty? In my opinion, however, this particular point does not take the
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The most drastic departure from orthodoxy was La Forest J.'s
challenge to the putative liability of employees for torts committed in
performing their employer's contractual obligations. In cases like the
present, involving a planned transaction with the employer, the plaintiff
can be considered to have chosen to deal with a company. The
employees were not given to understand that the plaintiff was relying on
them for compensation. Placing liability exclusively on the employer
puts it on a party that is easily able to modify its exposure by contractual
stipulation. In contrast, the employees had no real opportunity to
decline the risk, nor could their union be expected to bargain over an
issue that so rarely assumes practical significance. La Forest J.
sympathized with the position adopted in several legal systems, including
statutes in the Australian states of New South Wales, South Australia,
and the Northern Territory, which have totally abrogated the tort
liability of employees. However, he prudently confined his holding
within the parameters of the case before him, to what he called
"contractual vicarious liability"-that is, cases within a contractual
matrix.
La Forest J.'s reasoning led him to dissent from the conclusion of
the rest of the Court in that the defendants were liable, but only for
breach of a "$40 duty." His view of the employees' tort immunity, based
on policy rather than derived from the contract itself, meant that the
employees were not liable at all. In other words, they were not pro hac
vice identified with their employer any more than with his contract. This
conclusion more closely reflects the commonly held perception,
reinforced by the public policy behind vicarious liability, that employees
should not incur any liability for the torts committed by them in the
course of employment, but should be subject merely to disciplinary
sanction by their employer. On that view, the contractual setting should
be irrelevant, in which case neither the majority's preference for a jus
quaesitum tertio nor La Forest J.'s limitation of employees' tort immunity
to a contractual context looks like the ideal long-term solution. The
latter proves acceptable only as a step in the right direction.
Neither formula espoused in London Drugs would have defeated
the plaintiff in the latest case of Marc Rich & Co. A.G. v. Bishop Rock
Marine Co.3 1 The defendants' vessel loaded the plaintiffs cargo under a

matter very much further. If in principle the subcontractor owed no specific duty to the
building owner in respect of damage by fire, then neither in my opinion can any of its
employees have done so.
31 [1994] 1 W.LR. 1071 (C.A.) [hereinafter MarcRich].
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bill of lading limiting liability within the Hague Rules.3 2 A surveyor
employed by a classification society inspected the vessel and
recommended that she continue on her voyage. Shortly after leaving
port the vessel sank with loss of the plaintiff's cargo. The plaintiff,
having settled with the shipowners for the contractual limit, sought to
recover the remainder of the loss from the classification society. But the
Court of Appeal dismissed the claim-for what was treated as a physical,
not an economic, loss-denying a duty of care to the cargo owner
primarily on the ground that, since the shipowners bore primary,
contractual liability for the cargo under the complex international code
of the Hague Rules, it was not fair, just, or reasonable to impose a
virtually identical tort duty on the classification society without the same
balancing factors contained in the Rules. Mann L.J. noted an affinity to
Norwich City Council3 3 and Pacific Associates,3 4 where a "contractual
structure" had likewise negatived a tort duty. He admitted, however,
that, while relevant, the circumstances of these cases were different. The
difference, surely, was that the classification society was not performing
the contractual obligation of the shipowners, at least not in the same
sense as the subcontractor and the engineer had done in the earlier
cases. There clearly must be a closer nexus between the "contractual
structure" and the defendant's obligation for the one to define the other.
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Marc Rich has been affirmed by
the House of Lords, though which did not advert to issues relevant to the
present inquiry.35
III. DEFENSIVE CONTRACTS
I come now to a second situation relevant to defining the scope
of tort in the light of contract. A powerful argument, heard of late,
purports to deny a duty of care, particularly a duty to avoid pure
economic loss, if the claimant should have exercised his ability to guard
against the risk by self-protective measures, such as by contract with the

32 International Conference in Maritime Law (Brussels, 1924) Conventionfor the Unification
of Certain Rules of Law Relatingto Bills of Lading (Dublin: Stationery Office, 1994), as set out in
Schedule B to the Carriageof Goods by Sea Act, 1924 (U.K.), 14 & 15 Geo. 5, c. 22 [hereinafter
Hague Rules].
33

Supra note 5.

34

Supra note 3.

35 [1995] 3 A.C. 227 (H.L.).
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defendant or an intermediary. It was first voiced in The Aliakmon,36 in
support of the decision by the House of Lords to deny a tort remedy
against a negligent carrier to a consignee to whom the risk, but not the
property in the goods, had passed at the relevant time. Brandon L.J.
offered the buyers the cold comfort that they should have either
contracted with the sellers to3 7 exercise the right to sue the carrier, or
assigned such a right to them.
Brandon L.J.'s suggestion has struck a responsive chord in later
cases. It has, for example, played a role in the construction area in
denying tort recovery to a building owner against a subcontractor, or to a
contractor against the owner's supervising engineer, 38 on the reasoning
that the claimant could have contracted with the defendant for
additional protection; indeed, the claimant's failure to do so implied an
unwillingness to enter into formal relations with the defendant0 9 Thus,
accountants have been absolved from liability to investors, and even to
existing shareholders, on the ground, among others, that such plaintiffs
should have procured independent advice. 40 This argument is also
encountered in its negative form, namely, that the plaintiffs inability to
plan against the contingency of loss favours recognition of a duty of care
by the defendant. Hence the solicitor is liable in tort to the testator's
intended beneficiary, where the latter's inability to guard against the loss
reinforces the desirability of furnishing a sanction against professional
negligence. 41 Also, in the remarkable decision of Smith v. Bush,42 a
mortgagee's valuer was exceptionally held liable to the purchaser of a
"modest" home for an overvaluation, in view of the purchaser's
36

Supra note 1 at 819. See Tort Law andEconomic Interests, supranote 12 at 345-48.

37 But this advice stopped short of recognizing an equitable duty to sue on behalf of the
consignee, perhaps in deference to an obiterremark by Diplock L.L in TheAlbazero, supra note 1 at
845. Arguing in favour of such a duty is R.M. Goode, "Ownership and Obligation in Commercial

Transactions" (1987) 103 L.Q. Rev. 433 at 453ff. On the measure of damages in a suit by the
consignor, see GUS Property Management v. Littlewoods Mail Order Stores Ltd., [1982] S.L.T. 533
(H.L.); and Linden Gardens,supranote 1.
38 See, for example, Simaan, supra note 14; and PacificAssociates, supra note 3. Compare
InvercargillCity Council v. Hamlin, [1994] 3 N.Z.L.R. 513 at 520 (C.A.), Cook P., who expressed the

view that, in cases of "industrial construction, the network of contractual relationships normally
provides sufficient avenues of redress."
39 This is still more persuasive if there existed a contract between plaintiff and defendant that

dealt with extraneous matters, as in GreaterNottingham Co-op., supra note 14.
40

CaparoIndustriesPLC v. Diclonan, [1990] 2 A.C. 605 (H.L.).

41 White v. Jones, [1995] 2 A.C. 207 (H.L.). See also B.S. Markesinis, "Five Days in the House

of Lords" (1995) 3 Tort L. Rev. 169.
42 [1990] 1 A.C. 831 (H.L.) [hereinafter Smith].
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unfamiliarity with business matters which excused her failure to contract
for independent advice as one would have expected from a business
person.
Recently, my friend Jane Stapleton has repeatedly championed
Brandon L.J.'s argument as part of a larger agenda to roll back the
expansive pretensions of tort law during the Wilberforce era of the 1960s
and 1970s by directing the duty focus, not exclusively to the defendant's,
but equally toward the plaintiffs, conductL43 In the past, it had become
fashionable, especially among academic tort enthusiasts, to approach
new situations by asking, "Why not?," and the time had come to ask
"Why?" instead. Not that the focus should be solely on a plaintiffs
alternative means of self-protection; self-protection by first party
insurance was especially not about to be recognized as an adequate
means. 44 To qualify as adequate, the alternative means also had to
present also an adequate opportunity to deter the defendant. This was
so in the "contractual matrix" situations, where-to take Pacific
Associates45 as an illustration-the contractor was denied a remedy
against the engineer because the contractual structure gave him an
adequate remedy against his employer, the building owner, who in turn
could subject the engineer to sanction and deterrence. Rather than
rationalizing the decision, as the Court did, by refusing to allow the
plaintiff to circumvent the "clear basis" of understanding between three
commercial parties, a more objective criterion, less prone to slide into
fiction, was to say that the plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity to deal
directly with an intermediate party in a way that would exert deterrence
incentives on the defendant. Smith,46 by contrast, illustrates, not the
facile distinction presented by a plaintiff of modest means, but a market
condition which precluded negotiable variations at the modest end of
the housing market.
43 Her thesis, that absence of opportunity for self-protection was a necessary (though not
sufficient) condition of tort recovery, was first voiced in J. Stapleton, "Duty of Care and Economic
Loss: A Wider Agenda" (1991) 107 L.Q. Rev. 249 [hereinafter "A Wider Agenda"]. It has since
been refined by "adequate opportunities for deterrence," and is no longer restricted to claims for
economic loss: see J. Stapleton, "In Restraint of Tort" in The Frontiersof Liability, vol. 2 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1994); and J. Stapleton, "Duty of Care: Peripheral Parties and Alternative
Opportunities for Deterrence" (1995) 111 L.Q. Rev. 301 [hereinafter "Alternative Opportunites"].

44 This is not a self-evident proposition. The mirror image of universal accident compensation
is the replacement of all tort liability by first-party self-insurance, optional or mandatory.

Intellectually, the one is as radical a departure from traditional concepts about accident
compensation as the other. See "Alternative Opportunities," supra note 43.
45 Supra note 3.
46

Supra note 42.
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Yet, despite its evident appeal, this thesis cannot be accepted
without reservations. It not only lacks any consistent judicial support,
but is also plainly incompatible with many leading decisions. Such, for
example, is the pivotal precedent of Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller &
PartnersLtd.,47 where the plaintiff, in Stapleton's terminology, clearly
chose to "take a free ride" by relying on the banker's gratuitous advice
concerning the credit of one of its customers. Also, in the important
Canadian case of Norsk,48 it was given short shrift in a true contractual
matrix. In Norsk, the defendants, negligently navigating a barge, collided
in heavy fog with a bridge owned and operated by a public authority.
The plaintiffs, under licence from that authority, were the principal users
of the bridge, and sued for their loss caused by the disruption of its use.
A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, casting aside prior English
authority, allowed the tort claim against the bargees, notwithstanding the
availability of contractual planning against that risk with their
contractual partner, the owner of the bridge. Yet, as La Forest J. in his
masterly dissent pointed out, the plaintiffs were in a much better
position to assess that risk than were the defendants, and could easily
49
have shifted it to the bridge owner in their contract with it.
In Edgeworth Construction v. N.D. Lea & Associates Ltd.,50 a
unanimous Supreme Court of Canada decided in favour of a contractor
against an engineering firm for negligent specifications embodied in a
provincial construction project. The Court held that the presence of an
exclusion clause in the contract between the plaintiff and the province
did not purport to limit any tort duty by the engineering firm. Even La
Forest J. did not distance himself from the rest of the Court by drawing
attention to the contractor's failure to protect himself either in his

47 [1964] A.C. 465 [hereinafter Hedley Byrne]. Not surprisingly, this has been belittled by
Stapleton: "[F]ar from correcting a 'wrong turning,' Hedley Byrne judged by today's standards may
have been one itself." See "A Wider Agenda," supra note 43 at 259.
48
Norsk PacificSteamship Co. v. cNR, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 1021 [hereinafter Norsk].
49 In defence of La Forest J.'s dissent, see N. Siebrasse, "Economic Analysis of Economic Loss
in the Supreme Court of Canada: Fault, Deterrence, and Channelling of Losses in CNR v. Norsk
Pacific Steamship Co." (1994) 20 Queen's LJ. 1.
50 [1993] 3 S.C.R. 206 [hereinafter Edgeworth Construction]. This decision is clearly distanced
from Gran Gelato v. Richcliffe (Group) Ltd, [1992] Ch. 560, where Nicholls V.-C. denied a remedy
against a seller's solicitor who had made a direct misrepresentation to the purchaser, on the ground
that the latter had a contractual remedy against the vendor (who happened to be bankrupt). The
decision has been castigated by P. Cane, "Negligent Solicitor Escapes Liability" (1992) 108 L.Q.
Rev. 539. Compare South PacificMfg. Co. v. New ZealandSecurity Consultants& InvestigationsLtd,
[1992] 2 N.Z.L.R. 282 (C.A. Wellington) (disallowing a tort action against an investigator, employed
by the plaintiff's insurance company, who had incriminated the plaintiff of arson).
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contract with the province, or by contracting directly with the
defendants.51
A final example is the even more recent House of Lords decision
in Henderson,s2 from the aftermath of the Lloyd's of London disasters of
the past decade. The so-called Indirect Names brought action for
professional negligence, not only against their own members' agent, with
whom they were in a contractual relation, but also against managing
agents of syndicates with which risks were placed. Goff L.J. rejected the
analogy of the string contract building cases by finding a clear case of
assumption of responsibility towards the Names, sufficient for tort
responsibility, notwithstanding their undoubted remedy, concurrently in
contract and tort, against their own agent. Stapleton rightly rebukes
Goff L.J. for resting his reasoning on the mere assertion of assumption
of responsibility without an explanation of what it was about the
structure of the contractual chain that differentiated this case from
Simaan53 and others. But, by the same token, does this not also throw
doubt on the stability of the competing concept of "adequate
opportunity for self protection?" 5 4 This concern centres poignantly on
Smith with its stress on the purchase of the "modest dwelling" by a
woman unfamiliar with business affairs. While that approach was
entirely praiseworthy for its sensitivity to social realities-and
corresponds with the distinction drawn by legislation in England
between the rights of subsequent buyers of homes and those of
subsequent buyers of commercial property against the original
builder 55 -it is difficult to reconcile with Brandon L.J.'s insistence on
observing a "clear bright line" in cases of economic loss.56

51 Another interesting aspect of the decision, germane to this article, was the acquittal of the
individual engineers employed by the firm. Unlike in London Drugs, supra note 2, they were not
intended beneficiaries of their employers' exemption clause. In the Court's view, however, the fact
that they had affixed their seal to the design documents was insufficient to establish a duty of care to
the plaintiff. As elaborated by La Forest J., the plaintiff did not rely on them, but on their firm's
skills and pocketbook. Compare the similar reasoning in Trevor Ivory Ltd. v. Anderson, [1992] 2
N.Z.LR. 517 (C.A. Wellington).

52 Supra note 10.
53 Supra note 14.
54 Cane raised similar concerns about a lack of definition: see Tort Law, supra note 12 at 35051.
55 The Defective PremisesAct 1972 (U.K.), 1972, c. 35, creates a warranty for successive owners
of dwellings. Only commercial buyers are thus affected by Murphy, supra note 14.
56

TheAlialknon, supra note I at 817 and 820.
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And how can we reconcile this principle with the justification
frequently voiced for recognizing a tort duty, that the relation between
the parties was "akin to contract?" For, if that was indeed the case, why
did the parties not "go the extra mile," and form a contract? In Hedley
Byrne, for example, the relationship between the defendant bank and the
plaintiff, to whom the former had furnished a credit report through his
'5 7
own bank's mediation, was described as "the equivalent of contract."
In the controversial JuniorBooks case, which allowed an owner to sue a
subcontractor in tort for applying defective floor polish which
subsequently needed replacement, the relation between the parties was
described as "only just short of direct contractual relationship."58 And
though that decision has been widely disparaged in later cases, the
argument was heard again in Smith, where the purchaser of the "modest
home" was deemed to be in a relation "akin to contract"5 9 with the
valuer employed by the prospective mortgagee. Admittedly, the fact that
the cost of the valuation was debited from her account confirmed the
reality of the description. In none of these cases was it so much as
hinted that the plaintiff could have taken the opportunity to protect
herself by contract.
Cases such as Edgeworth Construction suggest the question of
how to justify requiring the plaintiff to protect himself or herself by
contract, when the defendant had an equal opportunity of contracting
for exemption. (In Edgeworth Construction, the Court did not require
the plaintiff to do so). Stapleton faces this issue bravely:
It is true that where it is found that P could have secured the deterrence-generating
protection described and a duty is denied, the negligent D escapes liability. But this will

only appear to be startling if we maintain the lopsided view that duty is generated by
defendant behaviour alone. If the interest the law takes elsewhere in P's capacity for self-

protection is addressed consistentlyby being considered also at the duty stage, we would
not be so surprised to find that the price of under-deterrence involved in such escapes
from liability is sometimes seen, and legitimately seen, as outweighed by pursuit of
60
incentives against free-riding.

Apart from anything else, this value preference leaves
unanswered the crucial question of when, indeed, such incentives against
free-riding might be justified. If anything, the running comment

57

Supra note 47 at 530.

58 Supra note 21 at 533.
59

Supra note 42 at 846.

60 "Alternative Opportunities," supra note 43 at 332.
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throughout Stapleton's article conveys an impression of its general
application.
At least two reasons give us pause. First, the suggested sanction
against free-riding seems not only unduly harsh, but runs counter to the
historical progress of tort law from long before the putative excesses of
the 1960s and 1970s. The universal revulsion against the contributory
negligence bar and its replacement by the more qualified formula of
apportionment tells a pertinent story. The drastic sanction against "freeriding," an offence which strikes one as less heinous than the
paradigmatic contributory negligence, looks like a disproportionate
response to the imagined evil. Second, as McLachlin J. pointed out in
her concluding remarks for the Court in Edgeworth Construction, "[o]ne
important policy consideration" 61 weighs against those in the position of
the defendant engineering firm: for, to require the contractor to conduct
a thorough professional review of the engineering design would involve
needless duplication of effort-a waste of economic resources for the
minor aim of encouraging self-discipline and thrift.
IV. CONCLUSION
The history of tort in the matrix of contract stretches back to
Winterbottom v. Wright,62 if not beyond. For a time, it was accepted that
a defendant's contractual undertaking pre-empted a corresponding tort
duty, not only to the contractual partner, but also to third parties.
Donoghue63 exploded this "privity fallacy" in relation to claims for
personal injury and damage to property. The fact that the defendant
owed a contractual obligation to A did not preclude the defendant also
owing a tort duty in the same matter to B. But other constellations of
the contract matrix raised new problems, mainly in the context of purely
economic loss, once the door to such claims was pushed slightly ajar by
Hedley Byrne. A common feature is their setting in a planned
transaction.
One such problem concerns the effect of a contractual limitation
clause on the tort liability of a third party. This can be resolved either by
expanding the reach of contract beyond privity, or by "jumping the
privity gap" in tort. The first part of this paper attempted to deal with

61

Supra note 50 at 220-21.

62 (1842), 10 M.& W. 109,152 E.R. 402 (Ex. P1.).
63

Supra note 7.
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various attempts to follow the tort route. Whether this is preferable to
the contract approach is quite another matter. It might be interesting to
speculate on why British courts adopted the one approach, while
American and Canadian courts inclined to the other. The answer, I
believe, lies in the comparative flexibility of American and Canadian
contract and tort rules. Whatever might be said in general about the
64
adaptability of the modem law of contract to changing social demands,
the privity rule has, in British perspective, assumed a unique aura of
untouchable classicism despite its relatively modern provenance. By
contrast, tort law has become free-flowing despite occasional cyclical
setbacks, such as those recently experienced. Resort to tort is therefore
seen as the only feasible avenue to the desired outcome, in much the
same way that German law, conversely, has been forced into contract
routines in order to escape the straitjacket of its outdated Code regime
of tort.65 In contrast, American and Canadian courts have felt freer to
choose between contract and tort without comparable doctrinal
constraints. In the present context, their preference for the contract
approach is undoubtedly due to the perception that it is the more
appropriate and effective way of dealing with a matter that arises in a
matrix of contract, and does not call for a last resort remedy of tort.
The other problem, in the context of a contract network, is what
effect to attribute to a plaintiffs failure to seize an opportunity for preemptive protection by contracting with the injurer or a third party. This
raises an issue of a different order, not the more or less technical one of
which road to travel to a desired destination, but one of substantive
policy. Should the protection of tort law be denied to a person capable
of advance planning against the risk? The emphasis on individual
responsibility in the political and economic ideology of the recent past
has provided support for this argument, but its place in received doctrine
must await further testing.
Both situations illustrate the weakening of the borders between
contract and tort, that were once so clearly delineated by the classical
theorists of both disciplines. Over twenty years ago, Grant Gilmore
presaged the Death of Contract,66 noting the ongoing absorption of
64 A generally optimistic view was recently taken in D.W. McLauchlan, "The 'New' Law of
Contract in New Zealand" [1992] N.Z. Recent L Rev. 436.

65 In the context of the problem discussed in Parts II and III, above, see H. K6tz, "The
Doctrine of Privity of Contract in the Context of Contracts Protecting the Interest of Third Parties"

(1990) 10 Tel Aviv Univ. Stud. L. 195.
66

Supra note 8. See also P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford:

Clarendon, 1979).
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contract into tort, among other factors, as the result of the socialization
of contract law, once the stronghold of private ordering against intrusion
by public policy. But that is only part of the story. In reality, the
interaction between contract and tort has become reciprocal: if contract
is being obliterated in some contexts, like concurrence, it has come to
define the incidence of tort duties in others. This is especially apparent
in the context of planned transactions which, until recently, fell within
the exclusive domain of contract. As tort has expanded its reach into
that sphere, it has learned to respect the important message of private
ordering.
These developments surfaced at a time of growing judicial
concern for ways to rein in the expansive, indeed explosive, potential of
tort liability, especially of the law of negligence. Stapleton's
distinguished writings 67 and my own paper are contributions to that
debate.

67

See generally supranote 43.

